Evaluating the jurisprudence of the African Commission on evidence obtained through human rights violations by Nanima, Robert
  Evaluating the jurisprudence of the African Commission   307
Evaluating the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission on evidence obtained through 
human rights violations 
Robert Doya Nanima
LLB DipLP LLM LLD
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Dullah Omar Institute, University of the Western Cape
SUMMARY
The normative framework of the African Commission, which regulates the
admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations, is largely
based on a number of instruments. These include the Tunisian Resolution,
the Dakar Declaration, the Robben Island Guidelines and the Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Representation in
Africa. It is argued that the emerging jurisprudence on evidence obtained
through human rights violations has a limited developmental framework,
owing to the normative framework. This contribution discusses the
normative framework, and qualifies the limited jurisprudence. The final
step engages the jurisprudence of the Commission followed by a
conclusion and recommendations.
1 Introduction 
The success of any human rights system is based on its institutional,
normative and jurisprudential framework. The institutional framework of
human rights protection in Africa is the African Union.1 In its Constitutive
Act of 2001, the African Union engages heads of States Parties to
promote and protect human and peoples' rights as provided for in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (The African Charter).2
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) was established by the African Charter,3 with a mandate to
promote and protect human rights.4 It must be noted, that in the exercise
of this mandate, the African Commission may formulate and lay down
principles and rules aimed at solving human rights issues, on which
States Parties may base their legislation.5 The African Charter is silent on
the mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights
1 Heyns “African Regional Human Rights System” 2003-04 Pennsylvania
State Law Review 681.
2 Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU), adopted by the OAU in Sirte,
Libya, on 2000-07-11 and entered into force 2001-05-26, para 9 of the
Preamble and arts 3(h) and 4(m).
3 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted by the
OAU in Nairobi, Kenya, on 1981-06-27 and entered into force on 1986-12-
21, art 30.
4 ACHPR, art 30.
5 ACHPR, art 45(1)(b) Udombana “The African Commission and Fair Trial
Norms” 2006 AHRLJ 305.
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violations. However, its institutional ability to formulate principles aimed
at solving legal problems deal with this silence. 
Another institutional structure of the African human rights system is
the African Court of Human Rights.6 Several reasons inform the author’s
decision to use the African Commission other than the African Court in
this study. This Court complements the protective mandate of the African
Commission.7 In its interpretation and application of the African Charter,
it uses decisions of the African Commission and other relevant human
rights instruments that will fall within its jurisdiction.8 In addition, the
African Commission has handed down approximately 358 decisions,9
unlike the African Court’s 88 decisions.10 The African Commission has
also been actively involved in the development of the normative
framework on evidence obtained through human rights violations,
between the period of 1992 and 2003. The African Court started
operating in 2004 and the African Commission as the focal point of the
study is instructive in evaluating its normative framework and the
emerging jurisprudence. 
For purposes of this contribution, the normative framework refers to
the development of soft law by the African Commission that guides it in
adjudicating complaints or communications which arise concerning
human rights violations. This stage has foreseen four normative
developments between 1992 and 2003. These include resolutions,
declarations, guidelines and principles. As shall be discussed in the
subsequent section, a great part of this soft law was adopted through
resolutions in a bid to improve the right to a fair trial. This right is a direct
reflection of the subtle issues that form the basis of this contribution
about evidence obtained through human rights violations.11 An overview
of the normative framework will aid the analysis of the emerging
jurisprudence.
2 Normative framework of the African 
Commission
The normative developments of the African Commission on evidence
obtained through human rights violations took place between the year
6 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights (Protocol)
adopted by the OAU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 1998-06-09 and
entered into force on 2004-01-25, art 1.
7 Protocol, art 2.
8 ACHPR, art 3(1). Stefiszyn “The African Union; challenges and
opportunities for women” 2005 AHRLJ 382.
9 Institute of Human Rights Defenders in Africa (2018-06-30) African Human
Rights Case Law Analyser, https://bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-
17).
10 African Court (2018-06-30) Statistics from the African Court’s website,
https://bit.ly/3iKJm4c (last accessed 2020-08-17).
11 See the discussion on the normative framework below. 
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1992 and 2003. This can be ascribed to the drastic developments
concerning the right to a fair trial experienced during this period. The
chronological developments foresaw the adoption of the Resolution on
the Right to Recourse and a Fair Trial (Tunis Resolution)12 and the Dakar
Declaration and Recommendations on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa
(Dakar Declaration).13 The other developments were the Guidelines and
Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island
Guidelines)14 and the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial
and Legal Assistance in Africa (The Principles).15 This section gives an
overview of these developments. 
2 1 Resolution on the Right and Recourse to a Fair Trial
In 1992, at its 11th Ordinary Session in Tunis, the African Commission
indicated that the right to a fair trial was not adequately provided for in
the African Charter.16 It did not provide for the right to an effective
remedy17 or require that an individual be promptly informed of the
charges against him or her,18 or that an individual is promptly brought
before the court.19 The African Commission adopted the Tunis
Resolution to address these issues and required that the State Parties
ensured that person in their jurisdiction had effective remedies and a
procedure that addressed violations of the right to a fair trial.20 Although
the resolution dealt with the right to a fair trial, it did not specifically deal
with instances of admission of evidence obtained through human rights
violations. This shortfall affected its effectiveness in dealing with
impugned evidence as a crucial component of the right to a fair trial.21
12 The Resolution on the Right to Recourse and a Fair Trial (Tunis Resolution)
adopted by the ACHPR at its 11th Ordinary session in Tunis, Tunisia, on
1992-03-09, Res.4(XI)92: 11th session ACHR/Res.4(XI)/1992. 
13 The Dakar Declaration and Recommendations on the Right to a Fair Trial in
Africa (Dakar Declaration), adopted by the ACHPR at its 26th ordinary
session in Dakar, Senegal on 1999-11-15, ACHR /Res.41(XXVI)1999.
14 The Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture,
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben
Island Guidelines) adopted by the ACHPR in Banjul, Gambia at its 32nd
session on 2002-10-29, ACHR/Res.61(XXXII)/2002.
15 The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal
Assistance in Africa (The Principles) adopted by the ACHPR in Banjul,
Gambia at its 33rd ordinary session on 2003-05-29, DOC/OS(XXX)247/
2003. Mashood “Developments in the African Regional Human Rights
System” 2005 HRLR 118.
16 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A
comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Development in
Africa (2006) 141.
17 Tunis Resolution, para 1.
18 Tunis Resolution, para 2(b).
19 Tunis Resolution, para 2(c).
20 Tunis Resolution, paras 2-5.
21 Moravcsik “Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international
politics” 1991 International organization 517 on the primacy of the
domestic society that represent the interests of individuals in a domestic
jurisdiction.
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2 2 Dakar Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial
In September 1999, the African Commission adopted the Dakar
Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa.22 It established that the
right to a fair trial was a fundamental right whose realisation depended
on the extinction of certain practices by the States Parties.23 These
included the elimination of state influence in the decisions of the
judiciary 24 and acts of impunity like torture.25 The Declaration required
that States Parties respect the rule of law as a way of realising the right
to a fair trial.26 Where the States recognise the right to due process from
the institution of preliminary investigations to the handing down of
decisions by courts, the instances of admitting evidence obtained
through human rights violations would be greatly reduced. 
Besides, the African Commission reiterated that the judiciary had to be
independent and impartial.27 While its independence dealt with the
appointment, security, and tenure of the members of the judiciary,
impartiality resonated with its ability to hand down decisions without the
influence of any person or organ.28 However, the existence of an
effervescent legal regime governing the judiciary, without rules on
evidence obtained through human rights violations would still fail to
solve the problem. 29 The adoption of this Declaration still pointed to the
general improvement of the right to a fair trial without dealing with the
specifics such as evidence obtained through human rights violations. It
referred to the general aspects such as legal representation, practices of
impunities by the States Parties, and independence of the judiciary. The
concept of legal representation would have been a specific issue if it was
engaged with instances of obtaining evidence through human rights
violations. It showed that while the African Commission kept its
perspective on the improvement of the right to a fair trial, it also
indicated a lack of foresight in dealing with the admission of impugned
evidence. However, its recognition of various aspects about the judiciary
showed that the African Commission would be instructive in forging the
foreign policy of States Parties.30
22 Dakar Declaration, para 1.
23 Dakar Declaration, para 1.
24 Dakar Declaration, para 2.
25 Dakar Declaration, paras 3 and 6.
26 Dakar Declaration, para 7.
27 Dakar Declaration, para 8.
28 Dakar Declaration, para 8.
29 Arts 126-151 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (hereafter
Constitution 1995) provides for a robust system on the judiciary. It still
lacks a provision on evidence obtained through human rights violations.
See Nanima “The legal status of evidence obtained through human rights
violations in Uganda” 2016 PELJ 1-38. The same was evident in the
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 1963, which had a legal regime
concerning the judiciary, but lacked a provision on evidence obtained
through human rights violations. 
30 Moravcsik 518.
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2 3 Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in Africa
The third development culminated in the adoption of the Robben Island
Guidelines. This development was informed by the requirement to tackle
instances of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment.31 The preamble stated: 
“Recalling the universal condemnation and prohibition of torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.”32
“Recognising the need to take positive steps to further the implementation of
the existing provisions on the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment.”33
This was a departure from the Tunis Resolution and the Dakar
Declaration that offered a general standard concerning the improvement
of the right to a fair trial. The Robben Island Guidelines offered a
constricted standard, which adequately dealt with evidence obtained
through torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.34 However,
this position did not embrace evidence that was obtained outside these
bounds. This posed another problem, namely, its failure to deal with
evidence obtained through other human rights violations that lacked a
taint of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.35
2 4 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial 
and Legal Assistance in Africa
The fourth major development was the passing of a resolution to
establish a working group to prepare a draft of general principles and
guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance. This led to the
adoption of the Principles, which introduced four key concepts. These
included the right to an effective remedy36 the role of prosecutors,37 the
prohibition of collection of evidence through a violation of a detained
suspect’s rights,38 and the rule on how to deal with evidence obtained
through force or coercion.39 These four concepts represented a
departure from a general model that sought to develop the right to a fair
trial to the specific issues that inform the admission of evidence through
human rights violations.
31 Robben Island Guidelines, preamble.
32 Robben Island Guidelines, para 1 to the preamble.
33 Robben Island Guidelines, para 4.
34 Robben Island Guidelines, para 7. See the ACHPR, arts. 5, 45.
35 Communication 416/2012, Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v Cameroon paras
81-83.
36 The Principles, principle (C)(a). 
37 The Principles, principle F.
38 The Principles, principle M(7)(d)-(f).
39 The Principles, principle N(6)(d)1.
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First, the Principles require that everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the domestic courts, which are competent with regard to their
composition and the officers who adjudicate cases.40 The State Parties
have an obligation to ensure that victims of human rights abuses have an
effective remedy.41 This requirement extends the scope of an effective
remedy from the conservative judicial remedies to those that deal with
the admission of evidence. The prosecutors have a key role to play in
instances where they have evidence that has been obtained through
human right violations. Where they come into possession of evidence
that has been obtained through a violation of the suspect’s human rights,
such evidence should not be admitted unless it is to be used against the
perpetrators.42
This principle creates a standard, which recognises the need to deal
with evidence obtained through human rights violations by the court and
the prosecution.43 Furthermore, it indicates that the prosecutors play a
significant role in ensuring that impugned evidence is not tendered for
admission. This principle reminds the parties not to engage in practices
that violate the rights of persons within its jurisdiction.44
The principles protect suspects in the course of collection of evidence
by the investigating arms of government. The States Parties are required
to ensure that all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment
are treated humanely.45 While it does not define “humane manner’, the
fact that the African Commission can engage the jurisprudence of other
human rights bodies offers a remedy to the situation. The relevant article
provides that:
“The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human
and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African
instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations,
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by
African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the
provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of
the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are
members.”46 
The State Party should collect evidence as it upholds the dignity of an
individual such that the subsequent admission of the evidence is not
contested.47 
40 The Principles, principle C(a). 
41 The Principles, principle C(c)(1). 
42 The Principles, principle F (l).
43 The Principles, principle M(7)(d) and F(l).
44 See the discussion on the Dakar Declaration above.
45 The Principles, principle M(7)(a)-(f).
46 ACHPR, arts 60, 61. 
47 For an extensive discussion on The Principles and evidence obtained
through human rights violations, see Nanima The legal status of evidence
obtained through human rights violations in Uganda (LLM thesis UWC 2016)
17-20.
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3 Qualifying “limited jurisprudence”
3 1 Defining jurisprudence
Jurisprudence is an imprecise term, which cannot be accorded one
definition. An engagement of the various definitions depicts a challenge
in defining it within the meaning of human rights bodies. It may refer to
a body of substantive legal rules or interpretations of a law by a judicial
or quasi-judicial body.48 In this regard, the African Commission uses its
substantive rules to hand down decisions.49 The challenge in their
enforcement eludes it of the conventional character of a judicial body.50
On another hand, jurisprudence is referred to as a scientific or
philosophical investigation of law and justice.51 This points to the notion
that jurisprudence refers to the knowledge of the law.52 This is further
expounded in the origins of the term. Jurisprudence is a product of two
Latin words, “juris” and “prudentia”.53 The term “juris” means law, and
“prudentia” means knowledge.54 This is an indication that the
knowledge of a law needs to have theoretical underpinnings that guide
its application. As a result, there should be an inquiry into what the law
is, or what it ought to be. This inquiry emphasises the basis other than
the components of the law. For instance, if morality forms the basis of a
law in a given community, the types of law, from criminal to civil laws,
adjectival to procedure laws ought to have elements of morality. Morality
is an abstract notion that changes from one society to another, and
human rights bodies are hesitant to enforce morals.55 
The foregoing two definitions fail to offer guidance on the
jurisprudence of a human rights body. A look at the perceptions of the
various schools of thought will aid our understanding of the concept of
jurisprudence. John Austin (1790-1859) defines jurisprudence as the
philosophy of positive law.56 He states that positive law consists of
commands set as rules of conduct by a sovereign to a member or
members of independent political society or the sovereign.57 This
48 Suri Jurisprudence (2009) 3.
49 Murray “The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and
international law” 2000 Leiden Journal of International Law 684.
50 Olukayode “Enforcement and Implementation Mechanisms of the African
Human Rights Charter: A Critical Analysis” 2015 Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization 52. Wolfgang “The African Charter and Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: How to make it more Effective” 1993
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25.
51 Suri 3.
52 Salmond Jurisprudence (1924) 1.
53 Salmond 1.
54 Salmond 1.
55 Handyside v United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights, Application
24/1976, para 48. Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria, (1994) 19 EHRR 3,
para 56 where the EctHR declined to rule on a single moral code for the
State Parties.
56 Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence (1875) 10.
57 Austin 10.
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definition ousts the position of international law as far as it does not
recognise international law as a sovereign entity that issues a set of
commands to be followed by the subjects. The point of departure is the
definition of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), which identifies law as the
mandate of the sovereign over the subjects.58 While Jeremy Bentham
advocates for morality as a yardstick for the law, John Austin states that
the former does not form part of the law. 
The intersection in the two different definitions is the requirement that
the law needs a basis to derive its authority. This basis may be in morality
or positivism. Concerning this conversation, it still requires the existence
of a sovereign entity to hand down the law. This contrasts the nature of
human rights bodies which recognises the sovereignty of States
Parties.59 
Thomas Holland (1835-1926) defines jurisprudence as a formal
science of positive law.60 He alludes to the definition by John Austin and
adds the concept of “formality” of the law. This definition shows the
command of the sovereign as the basis of the law, without concern for
its implementation. The implementation of the law is important in
society as it leads to redress of criminal and civil wrongs. It shows that
the judicial function of the courts is the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. In addition to the concept of sovereignty does
not aid the enforcement of human rights in a domestic or international
community and as such it does not offer adequate guidance to this study.
John Salmond (1862-1924) defines jurisprudence as the science of the
first principle of civil law.61 His concept includes two parts. First, generic
law, which refers to the entire body of legal doctrine.62 Secondly, the
specific law, which deals with basic parts of the law such as the analytical,
historical or ethical doctrines.63 According to this definition,
jurisprudence deals with both the basis and the implementation of the
law. This is an indication that the knowledge of the law is not complete
unless its implementation is considered. Arguably, an adequate
understanding of a legal system lies in evaluating its content, evolution
and the ideals that it stands for. An evaluation of these three concepts
engages with the implementation of the law as far as they deal with the
substantive law, the reasons that inform its existence and its
implementation. Therefore, this definition creates a fusion of the basis of
the law and its implementation. 
The definitions of jurisprudence by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and
Holland are inclined to the basis of the law, without dealing with its
58 William “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld” 1982 Wisconsin Law Review 984.
59 Olukayode 52. Wolfgang 25.
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implementation. This position that has little regard to the
implementation of the law does not offer guidance to this study.
However, Salmond’s view aids the understanding of the jurisprudence of
international human rights bodies. On this basis, the article sets out to
place the jurisprudence of the African Commission into context. 
3 2 Defining Jurisprudence of human rights bodies
The jurisprudence of the human rights bodies has no definite definition.
It may only be understood in the context it is used. It may refer to human
rights recommendations or findings on individual communications that
are issued by human rights bodies.64 It may also refer to the legal
interpretation of international human rights law as it develops.65 There
is no uniform model about this jurisprudence of human rights monitoring
bodies despite the comparisons of the general principles that govern the
universality of human rights across the globe.66 For instance, the African
Commission may have resolutions, declarations, guidelines, decisions
and General Comments.67 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
relies on the decisions it hands down. The question is whether a
limitation may exist despite the existence of various forms of
jurisprudence.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the United Nations monitors
the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).68 It uses its decisions, General Comments and
recommendations in its Concluding Observations as its jurisprudence.
The General Comments offer insight on how various articles of the ICCPR
may be interpreted.69 The Human Rights bodies also use Concluding
Observations to enforce the observance of rights by States Parties. In
some of its Concluding Observations, the HRC requires that State Parties
desist from the use of torture and arbitrary deprivation of liberty in illegal
detention areas.70 It recommends that an accused must appear before a
64 Jurisprudence, 1997 (2018-06-30), http://juris.ohchr.org/Home/About, (last
accessed 2020-08-17).
65 Jurisprudence, 1997 (2018-06-30), http://juris.ohchr.org/Home/About, (last
accessed 2020-08-17).
66 Cerna “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity:
Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts”
1994 Human Rights Quarterly 740; Donnelly “The relative universality of
human rights” 2007 Human Rights Quarterly 281.
67 See discussion above on normative frameworks.
68 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by the
General Assembly in New York, USA on 1966-12-19 and entered into force
on 1976-03-23, 999 UNTS 171, art 28.
69 CCPR General Comment No 13 Equality before the Courts and the Right to
a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law Doc
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1984); CCPR General Comment No 20 Prohibition of
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994); CCPR General Comment No 32 Right to
equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/
32 (2007).
70 UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/UGA (30 June 2004) para 17.
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judicial officer within a reasonable time.71 These Concluding
Observations may be used to complement the work of other human
rights bodies by requiring that States Parties implement these
recommendations.72 
Like the African Commission, the HRC has various forms of
jurisprudence. The three bodies all offer principles on human rights as
the overriding factor. Salmond’s definition depicts the jurisprudence of
human rights bodies as the principles that guide their decisions,
regardless of the tools that are labelled as “jurisprudence”. Besides, this
definition aids the implementation of this jurisprudence by the State
Parties.
3 2 Qualifying the concept of “limited jurisprudence”
The experiences of other human rights bodies can be used to elaborate
on the “limitation” of the jurisprudence of the African Commission. The
HRC has many sources like decisions, General Comments and
Concluding Observations. This is synonymous with the African
Commission that has resolutions, declarations, General Comments,
Concluding Observations and decisions on the communications. About
this study, the jurisprudence includes the Tunis Resolution, the Dakar
Declaration, Robben Island Guidelines and the Principles. The position is
different with the ECtHR, which only relies on its decisions as part of its
normative framework. The cumulative effect of the application of the
normative framework should be the use of this jurisprudence to hand
down informed decisions that are based on legal principles in the
normative framework. It is on this basis that the concept of “limitation of
the jurisprudence” has to be qualified, to justify the subsequent
evaluation of the Commission.
The lack of a normative framework that is distinct from the decisions
that a human rights body passes should not be used as the yardstick for
ruling out the existence of emerging jurisprudence.73 For instance, in
Saunders v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR dealt with compulsion and
stated that evidence that arose out of a legal compulsion to incriminate
an applicant rendered the trial unfair.74 In the subsequent case of Jalloh
v Germany, the ECtHR used the concept of severity to qualify the use of
legal compulsion to obtain evidence.75 In Gafgen v Germany, the ECtHR
balanced compulsion and fairness of a trial. It stated that evidence
obtained through cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may be
71 UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/KEN (28 March 2005) para 17.
72 UN Doc CCPR/C/CHN- HKG/CO/3 (12-13 March 2013) para 8. The HRC
recommended that Hong Kong implements the recommendations of the
CAT, requiring it to bring its laws to conform with the UNCAT.
73 Saunders v the United Kingdom (1996) ECHR Series A No. 6, Jalloh v
Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 32, Gafgen v Germany (2010) 52 EHRR 1.
74 Saunders v the United Kingdom supra, paras 75, 76.
75 Jalloh v Germany supra, paras 113-120.
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admitted in Court if its admission does not render the trial unfair.76 In
this vein, a limitation in developing jurisprudence is not in the number of
decisions of a human rights body, but rather the quality of the decision.
This quality is evident in the developments on a given principle of law.
At this point, it is clear that the normative framework of the African
Commission was developed to improve the standard of the right to a fair
trial, with little regard to the mode of dealing with evidence obtained
through human rights violations. This is noted in the fact that the Tunis
Resolution and the Dakar Declaration do not expressly deal with
evidence obtained through human rights violations. This is exacerbated
by the fact that the Robben Island Guidelines are limited to evidence
obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. As a
point of departure, the Principles present a streamlined mode of dealing
with evidence obtained through human rights violations.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “limit” as a boundary of
scope, be it authority, power, privilege, or right.77 The application of this
definition to the norms of the African Commission on evidence obtained
through human rights violations specifies that the scope of the Tunis
Resolution and the Dakar Declaration did not envisage evidence obtained
through human rights violations. Therefore, this section evaluates both
the normative framework and the jurisprudence of the African
Commission. 
The human rights bodies resonate with the universality of human
rights. The concept of universality is the over-arching principle and not
the normative framework.78 The HRC has the mandate to deal with
complaints and communications from 174 States Parties.79 The ECtHR
handles complaints and communications from 47 States Parties, which
are litigious societies.80 This is evident in the fact that it received 280,512
applications from the year 1998 to 2008, and delivered 9,399 decisions
in the same period.81 The Commission has handed down 229 decisions
since its inception.82 A quantitative approach in assessing whether the
Commission’s jurisprudence is limited would be misleading. Therefore,
the limitation concerns the quality of the jurisprudence in as far as it
76 Gafgen v Germany supra, para 108.
77 Definition of “Limit” (2018-06-30), http://thelawdictionary.org/limit/ (last
accessed 2020-08-17). 
78 The European Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the members of
the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France on 1950-11-04 and entered into
force 1953-09-03, 213 UNTS 221, preambular paras 2 and 6; ACHPR,
preamble, para 4; ICCPR preamble, para 2.
79 Ratification table to the ICCPR (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/2E5CHTr (last
accessed 2020-08-18).
80 47 Member States (2017-06-30), https://bit.ly/326MNvg (last accessed
2020-11-18).
81 Ten years of the “new” European Court of Human Rights 1998- 2008
Situational Outlook, 78-90 (2017-06-30), https://bit.ly/2Q2gZ5h (last
accessed 2020-08-17).
82 Statistics from the African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30),
https://bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
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develops principles that deal with evidence obtained through human
rights violations. A study of the jurisprudence of the Commission on
evidence obtained through human rights violations will look at the quality
of the jurisprudence, whether it is limited, and the factors that inform this
limited jurisprudence. 
An approach that looks at the number of the decisions passed may not
offer adequate guidance to creating a framework for the definition of a
limited jurisprudence. An analysis in the interim reveals that the ECtHR
offers detailed and well reason judgments, which develop its
jurisprudence.83 With the aid of the definition of a “limit” from Black’s
law dictionary, an approach that engages the limits in the jurisprudence
in the quality of the decisions is preferred. This is because it supersedes
the arguments that uplift sources of jurisprudence and the number of
decisions passed by a human rights monitoring body, other than the
quality of the decisions. 
4 Emerging jurisprudence
This section visits the decisions of the Commission from the year 2003
to 2015, from the 32nd to the 54th sessions. Out of the 41 decisions that
were handed down, the discussion is narrowed down to four decisions.84
These decisions have three distinct features. Firstly, they relate to the
right to a fair trial. Secondly, they reiterate the principles that ensure the
enjoyment of the right to a fair trial. Thirdly, they aid in the
understanding of the jurisprudence of evidence obtained through human
rights violations. These features inform an engagement that deals with
these four concepts. These include bringing the law into conformity with
the African Charter, exhaustion of local remedies, the responsibility of
state actors, and dealing with evidence obtained through torture. These
principles form the key issues in the Commission’s deliberations on the
merits of the communications.
4 1 Bringing the law into conformity with the African 
Charter
The general rule regarding international treaties is that a State cannot
invoke its national law as a justification for the non-compliance with
international law.85 Concerning the Principles and the Robin Island
Guidelines, State Parties are expected as a matter of principle to comply
83 Saunders v the United Kingdom supra; Jalloh v Germany supra and Gafgen v
Germany supra on incriminating evidence. 
84 Communications 222/1998 and 229/199, Law Office of Ghazi Suleman v
Sudan 9; Communication 250/2002, Liesbeth v Eritrea; Communication
245/2002, Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Government Organisations Forum v
Zimbabwe; Communication 334/2006, Egyptian Initiative and Interights v
Egypt.
85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) adopted by the General
Assembly in Vienna, Austria on 1969-05-23 and entered into force 1980-
01-27, 1155 UNTS 331, art 27.
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with this soft law.86 When a State Party ratifies the African Charter, it has
an obligation to uphold the fundamental human rights contained therein,
even in instances where it does not enact domestic legislation to effect
the African Charter’s incorporation87 
The ICCPR requires that each State Party “undertakes to take the
necessary steps, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present
Covenant.”88 This is to ensure that the State Parties uphold their
obligations under the international treaties.
Other international instruments, such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
require States Parties to: 
“… embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein
and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical
realisation of this principle”.89 
This provision adds a voice to the requirement to uphold the rights
enshrined in international and regional treaties, provided the parties are
States Parties. While some authors have criticised the Commission’s view
on the premise that its findings are not binding and consequently a State
may disregard them,90 the findings remain persuasive like the opinions
of the United Nations Human Rights Committee.91 
The African Charter requires that a complainant enjoys the right to a
lawyer as a component of the right to a fair trial.92 The position formed
the adoption of the Tunis Resolution as far as the failure to engage the
right to a lawyer affected the right to a fair trial.93 The practice of
violating this right with impunity formed the adoption of the Dakar
Declaration.94 This position was tested in Law Office of Ghazi v Sudan.95
86 ACHPR supra art 45(1)b; Purohit v The Gambia (2003) Africa Human Rights
Law Reports 96 para 43.
87 Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International Law Commission at its first session and forwarded to the
General Assembly as a report on 1949-12-06, GA Res 375/1949. Wachira &
Abiola “Twenty years of elusive enforcement of the recommendations of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A possible
remedy” 2006 AHRLJ 472.
88 ICCPR, art 2(2).
89 Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) adopted by the General Assembly in New York, USA on
1979-12-18 and entered into force on 1981-09-03, 1249 UNTS, art 2(a).
90 Murray 684.
91 Murray 684.
92 ACHPR, art 7.
93 See discussion on Tunis Resolution above.
94 See discussion on Dakar Declaration above.
95 Ghazi supra, para 2.
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The victims were arrested and detained without charge by the
government of Sudan on 1 July 1998.96 In the course of their detention,
the complainants were denied a lawyer and contact with their families.97
The second complaint decried the trial of civilians by a military court
established by a Presidential decree.98 Although the President later
pardoned the victims,99 this did not solve questions about the violation
of the right to counsel and other questions concerning their illegal
detention and allegations of torture. 
The gist of the matter is that the admission of evidence obtained in the
course of the illegal detention would be contested. The complainants
alleged a violation of the right to a fair trial under article 7 of the African
Charter.100 This was evident in the State Party’s wide publicity that the
complainants attempted to overthrow the government. This publicity
presumed them guilty before the domestic court could make its
findings.101 This kind of publicity potentially rendered any subsequent
trial unfair because of the utterances by the state officials, about the
complainants’ guilt. While the African Commission did not consider this
position, this turn of events substantially affected the position of the
complainants about their right to the presumption of innocence.102
There is persuasive jurisprudence that a process that substantially affects
the position of a complainant may lead to a finding of an unfair trial,
especially in instances where evidence has been obtained through
human rights violations.103 The African Commission ought to have
advised the State Party to ensure that its laws on the right to a counsel
and the right to a fair trial conform to the principles of the African
Charter. 
While the African Commission noted that the State Party’s failure to
uphold the complainants’ right to a lawyer violated their right to a fair
trial,104 it found no proof of violation of the right to a fair trial concerning
confessions obtained from the complainants in the course of their
detention.105 The fact that the complainants were denied the right to a
lawyer as soon as they were detained, was an indication that any
evidence following this violation was tainted with illegality. 
The African Commission did not expressly state the section of the
domestic law that was required to be brought into conformity with the
African Charter.106 At the same time, the State Party had laws that
provided for detention beyond 48 hours. The State Party would use its
96 Ghazi supra, para 3.
97 Ghazi supra, para3.
98 Ghazi supra, paras 5-6.
99 Ghazi supra, para 29.
100 Ghazi supra, para 8.
101 Ghazi supra, para 54.
102 Compare Shabelnik v Ukraine [2009] ECHR 302 para 53.
103 Shabelnik supra, para 53.
104 Shabelnik supra, para 57.
105 Shabelnik supra, para 55.
106 Shabelnik supra, paras 56, 59.
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National Security Act to charge, detain and interrogate an individual for
72 hours.107 This detention could be renewed for up to one month,
without justification.108 In addition, bail would not be granted to persons
who were accused of crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment.109 This detention beyond 48 hours was illegal, and the
subsequent purported interrogations and any evidence that was obtained
could not be relied on as admissible evidence. The African Commission
did not evaluate the contents of the National Security Act, probably
because they were not brought to its attention. However, the final
decision requiring that Sudan brings its laws into conformity with the
African Charter was specifically directed at this law. At the time of
conducting this research, the author noted that provisions of the National
Security Act that allowed the renewal of detention have survived all
repeals to the Security Acts. Firstly, the National Security Forces Act of
1999, which repealed the National Security Act of 1994, still provides for
detention for three days, which could be renewed for 30 days,110 and a
further 30 days.111 Secondly, the National Security Act 2010, which
repealed the National Security Forces Act of 1999, still provides for
detention for 30 days, which can be renewed for 30 days,112 and a
further 15 days.113 At the time of preparing this article, the author was
not aware of any communication by the African Commission to Sudan to
ensure that these sections conform to the principles of international
law.114 
At the date of communication of this decision, the four norms that
form the basis of this study had been enacted.115 The Commission did
not use the Tunis Resolution or the Dakar Declaration, to point to the
evidence obtained through human rights violations.116 However, it
emphasised the right to freedom of expression.117 This was evident in
the requirement to States Parties to adhere to the principles that govern
the right to a fair trial, without offering guidance on the specific aspects
107 Report to the US Department of Defence on Sudan Human Rights Practices
1994, paras 19-20 (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/3haek5C, (last accessed
2020-08-17).
108 Report to the US Department of Defence on Sudan Human Rights Practices
1994, paras 19-20 (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/3haek5C, (last accessed
2020-08-17).
109 Report to the US Department of Defence on Sudan Human Rights Practices
1994, paras 19-20 (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/3haek5C, (last accessed
2020-08-17) para 20.
110 S 30(d) of the National Security Forces Act 1999 (hereafter NSFA).
111 S 30(e) of the NSFA.
112 S 50(1)(e) of the NSFA. 
113 S 50(1)(g) of the NSFA.
114 Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 4th and 5th
Periodic Report of the Republic of Sudan, paras 31-33, 66-67 provide
recommendations on the National Security Act 2010, but do not refer to the
codified long periods of detention.
115 The decision refers to The Principles, and the Dakar Declaration in paras
65- 66.
116 Ghazi supra, para 65.
117 Ghazi supra, paras 54, 66.
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that govern the instances of the right to legal representation and the
presumption of innocence. The failure by the African Commission to give
specific recommendations to States Parties on how to deal with evidence
obtained violation of the right to a lawyer and the presumption of
innocence indicated a limited development in its jurisprudence with
regard to human rights violations. 
4 2 Exhaustion of local remedies
The exhaustion of local remedies is a tool used by various regional and
international bodies to gauge the complaints and communications that
they should address.118 This rule ensures that the domestic institutions
have the opportunity to deal with violations before the human rights
bodies.119 This tool engages the principle of non-intervention and state
sovereignty in matters that the latter can rectify, without interference
from other states.120 The local remedies have to be available, effective
and sufficient.121 According to the ECtHR, the exhaustion of remedies is
a recognised rule of international law that forms part of the customary
international law.122 
The African Commission uses the exhaustion of local remedies as a
tool that deals with instances of evidence obtained through human right
violations, by subjecting a complaint to the admissibility test.123 In
Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v Eritrea, the Commission dealt with
the rule regarding exhaustion of remedies. The complainant alleged that
the illegal arrest of eleven former Eritrean government officials in
Asmara, Eritrea, in September 2001 violated Eritrean laws and the
African Charter.124 The African Commission acknowledged that
exhaustion of a domestic remedy was a condition precedent to obtaining
the right of appearance before it.125 It also reiterated that the exhaustion
of a domestic remedy is dependent on whether it is available, effective
and sufficient.126 The availability of a domestic remedy depends on the
petitioner’s ability to pursue it without impediment, and its effectiveness
depends on its offer of a prospect of success and its sufficiency depends
on its capability to redress the complaint.127 
118 ACHPR, art 56(5); European Convention, art 41(1) (c). 
119 Cancado “Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of
local Remedies in International Law” 1976 Belgium Review of International
Law 521; European Convention, art 22.
120 Cancado 521. 
121 De Jong, Baljiet and Van den Brink (1984) 8 EHRR 20.
122 Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 2014 Council of Europe, 22 (2018-
06-30), https://bit.ly/3kRbcgW (last accessed 2020-08-17). 
123 ACHPR, art 56(5). As at 17 June 2018, a total of twenty-six communications
had been dismissed on grounds of inadmissibility. These included 19
concerning failure to exhaust remedies and 3 decisions on the right to a fair
trial (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/3axjJBd (last accessed 2020-08-17).
124 Liesbeth supra, para 2.
125 Liesbeth supra, para 22.
126 Liesbeth supra, para 37.
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This is closely related to the principle of primacy, which recognises
that the ECtHR has a role to play in monitoring the enforcement of the
domestic authorities’ implementation of the European Convention.128
This principle requires that an individual has access to a remedy in a
domestic court, which effectively implements the provisions of the
European Convention.129 This resonates with the availability of a remedy
as laid out in Liesbeth, where an individual should be able to pursue it
without any impediment. The requirement by the principle of primacy
that an individual should have a substantive review of his or her
complaint in the domestic court130 is a point of departure in the two
human rights bodies as far as the question of substantiality has not yet
been dealt with directly by the African Commission. 
The African Commission reiterates that the effectiveness of a remedy
lies in its prospect of success.131 This is synonymous with the principle
of primacy, which indicates that an individual should have access to
provisional measures in the course of the determination of a matter by a
domestic court.132 Besides, the Tunis Resolution recognised the need for
the effectiveness of a remedy to buttress the right to a fair trial.133 The
grey area was evident in its failure to offer guidance on how to deal with
evidence obtained through human rights violations. Therefore, if a State
Party unduly prolonged the process of accessing a remedy, then the
Commission would find that the principle of exhaustion of the remedy
would not be applicable.134 Some scholars suggest that remedies that
need to be exhausted should be judicial remedies and not discretionary
remedies.135 That discussion is outside the scope of this contribution.
A point of concern is where the domestic laws of a country have a
legislative procedure that offers a remedy for evidence obtained through
human rights violations. This is an indication that the remedy has to be
exhausted through the required procedure for one to have standing
before the Commission. 
The exhaustion of remedies is a precursor to the admissibility of a
communication by the African Commission.136 A look at the statistics of
the communications decided on their merits, and on admissibility is
crucial to informing the conversation on the exhaustion of remedies. The
127 Liesbeth supra, para 37. The ACHPR relied on Communications 147/95 and
149/96 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia and Velasquez Rodríguez Case
(29 July 1988) Series C No. 4.
128 Christoffersen Fair balance: proportionality, subsidiarity and primarity in the
European Convention on Human Rights (2009) 359. 
129 Christoffersen 361.
130 Christoffersen 361.
131 Liesbeth supra, para 37. 
132 Christoffersen 361.
133 The Tunis Resolution, para 1.
134 Communication 361/2008, Zitha & Zitha v Mozambique para 101. 
135 Enabulele & Bazuaye “Setting the Law Straight: Tanganyika Law Society v
Tanzania and Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies before the African Court”
2014 Mizan Law Review 237.
136 See notes 121-130 above.
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African Human Rights Case Law Analyser indicates that the African
Commission has handed down 229 decisions since its inception.137 The
outcomes of these decisions fall into 13 categories. These include
amicable settlements, referrals under art 58(1), decisions on merit,
dismissed, files closed, outcome inconclusive, and postponed “sine
die”.138 Other outcomes include provisional measures, rejection at
seizure stage, review on merits, rulings of inadmissibility and the
withdrawal of communications.139 While it is acknowledged that the
Commission had reasons for the various outcomes, as at 30 June 2017
only 89 out of the 229 communications have been decided on merits.140
This accounts for 38% of the communications. Besides, 90
communications have been ruled inadmissible,141 accounting for 39%
of the total number of communications. Subject to substantial research,
these figures may be instructive in increasing the number of
communications that are decided on merit and increasing the number of
decisions that are declared inadmissible. 
In the interim, the admissibility of communications that deal with
evidence obtained through human rights violations poses a potential
loophole, which disregards the cases with merit. The African Charter
requires that a communication be considered if it satisfies the
admissibility test.142 The grounds require that the authors disclose their
identity although they seek to remain anonymous 143 and that the
communications are compatible with the African Charter.144 The
communication should not be written in disparaging or insulting
language against the State or the institutions of the African Union,145 that
it is not based exclusively on media reports.146 The complainant should
have exhausted all local remedies,147 and that the communication is
submitted within a reasonable time.148 The final requirement is that the
communication should not be under consideration by any other
international or regional treaty body.149 This contribution visits the
ground that requires that all local remedies be exhausted before the
137 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30), https://
bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
138 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30), https://
bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
139 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30), https://
bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
140 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30), https://
bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
141 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser (2018-06-30), https://
bit.ly/2EdkHqc (last accessed 2020-08-17).
142 ACHPR, art 56.
143 ACHPR, art 56, ground 1.
144 ACHPR, art 56, ground 2; Communication 383/2010 Mohamed Abdullah
Saleh Al Asad v Djobouti.
145 ACHPR, art 56, ground 3.
146 ACHPR, art 56, ground 4.
147 ACHPR, art 56, ground 5.
148 ACHPR, art 56, ground 6. Commission Communication 305/2005 Article 19
v Zimbabwe, Communication 306/2005 Samuel Muzerengwa v Zimbabwe.
149 ACHPR, art 56, ground 7.
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Commission considers a communication. Where the local remedies
cannot be exhausted, the complainant has to show that the remedy in
issue is unavailable, ineffective or insufficient, other than making
generalised statements.150
There is a debate as to whether exhaustion of remedies may be a
substantive or a procedural issue.151 This section unpacks the exhaustion
of remedies as a procedural issue and places it within the context of the
evidence obtained through human rights violations. Some States Parties
have laws that require that a person seeking a remedy for evidence
obtained through human rights violations files a formal application with
a domestic court. This is distinguished from instances where one alleges
that evidence was obtained through human rights violations, and the
court conducts a trial-within-a-trial to ascertain the voluntariness of
obtaining the evidence.152 
In Zimbabwe, a complainant who seeks the non-admission of
evidence obtained through human rights violations has to file a formal
application for permanent stay of criminal proceedings before the
remedy is granted.153 On this basis, his or her communication may be
technically disregarded by the African Commission for failure to exhaust
this procedural domestic remedy. In other countries such as South Africa,
a case with similar facts may pass the admissibility test due to lack of a
similar procedural requirement. This is because the domestic courts may
use a trial-within-a-trial, to establish the voluntariness of obtaining the
evidence without formally applying.154 This requirement to exhaust
domestic remedies poses a challenge to equality before the Commission
since complainants from jurisdictions that have this procedural
requirement have to apply formally for the remedy. Conversely,
complainants from jurisdictions that do not provide for a procedure to
follow do not have to prove the exhaustion of this remedy to court.
Therefore, persons with similar complaints, other than this procedural
requirement, may receive different treatment in the course of
establishing the admissibility of the complaint before the Commission.
The Commission has not taken any positive steps to provide clarity by
way of Concluding Observations or General Comments. The Concluding
Observations of the Commission play a vital role in ensuring that
evidence obtained through human rights violations is not admitted.155
Some of the recommendations included advising States Parties to
150 Communication 338/07Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v
The Federal Republic of Nigeria.
151 Silvia & Kathrin “The rule of prior exhaustion of local remedies in the
international law doctrine and its application in the specific context of
human rights protection” 2007 European University Institute 1-4.
152 S 35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1998 (hereafter
Constitution). 
153 Jestina Mukoko V Attorney General Unreported case 36/ 2009 (20 March
2012). 
154 S 35(5) of the Constitution. 
155 See notes 159-161, below.
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provide an independent Police oversight body156 and criminalisation of
torture.157 Other States Parties have been advised to conform to the
definition of torture as provided for in the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (UNCAT).158 The African Commission, therefore, in its
Concluding Observations to States, has shown the areas of concern and
recommendations for dealing with evidence obtained through human
rights violations. 
4 3 Responsibility for non-state actors
Under international law, three categories of non-state actors are
identified. These include armed groups like rebels, paramilitaries,
mercenaries and militias;159 national and transnational corporations;160
and other non-state actors.161 The Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote
and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, (Declaration)162 requires that States Parties exercise due
diligence to prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights
enshrined in the Declaration. The African Commission is empowered to
use the provisions of this Declaration under the African Charter.163 The
States should prevent the violations of the rights of defenders under their
jurisdiction by taking legal, judicial and administrative and all other
measures to ensure the full enjoyment by defenders of their rights. These
include investigating alleged violations, prosecuting alleged perpetrators
and providing defenders with remedies and reparation. The state cannot
absolve itself of liability if the perpetrators of human rights violations are
non-state actors. The requirement on the state to exercise due diligence
is a way of assessing whether the state has acted in fulfilment of its
obligations.164 
156 Concluding Observations on consolidated 2nd to 10th Report of Tanzania of
2008, para 24 (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/2DQVTVa (last accessed 2020-08-
17).
157 Concluding Observations on 3rd Periodic Report of Uganda of 2006 para
27, article V, paras (e) and (f) (2018-06-30), https://bit.ly/2YaFNMR (last
accessed 2020-08-17).
158 United Nations Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (UNCAT) adopted by the General Assembly in New
York, USA on 1984-02-04 and entered into force on 1987-06-12, 1465
UNTS 85. Concluding Observations on initial periodic report of Botswana,
of 2010 (12th to 20th May 2010), https://bit.ly/3atL1s6 (last accessed 2020-
08-17).
159 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Margaret Sekagya on the situation of
human rights defenders A/65/223 dated 4 August 2010, 3.
160 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Margaret Sekagya on the situation of
human rights defenders A/65/223 dated 4 August 2010, 4.
161 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Margaret Sekagya on the situation of
human rights defenders A/65/223 dated 4 August 2010, 5.
162 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the General Assembly at its
53rd session on 1999-03-08, GA Res 53/144, UN GAOR, UN Doc A/RES/53/
144 annex.
163 ACHPR, arts 60 and 61.
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An assessment on whether the African Commission offers clarity on
evidence obtained through human rights violations by vigilantes is
instructive. This is because some countries have developed jurisprudence
that deals with evidence from vigilantes. In South Africa, evidence
obtained through human rights violations may still be admitted if it was
obtained in a manner that did not violate the rights of an accused
person.165 In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, the
African Commission dealt with the issue of the scope of responsibility for
state actors in human rights violations. The facts are that the Zimbabwe
NGO Forum, brought this claim, alleging that following the Constitutional
Referendum in 2000, there was widespread violence targeted at white
farmers, black farm workers, teachers, civil servants and people believed
to be supporting opposition parties.166 Because of the violence, 82
people lost their lives.167 The complainants stated that the police and the
army of Zimbabwe failed to intervene in the incident of criminal activity.
According to the Commission, the term “state actors” referred to
individuals, organisations, institutions, and other bodies that were acting
outside State organs.168 
The Commission stated that the complainants failed to prove, first,
that the war veterans were state actors,169 and secondly that the
government of Zimbabwe acquiesced to their acts.170 The human
standards of the African Charter require that the state takes positive steps
to prevent private violations of human rights of individuals under its
jurisdiction.171 The prevention of these violations of human rights does
not end with the observance of the human rights standards by state
organs, but require the state to ensure that third parties, like non-state
actors, do not interfere with the enjoyment of rights of individuals under
its jurisdiction.172 The state is expected to exercise due diligence to
prevent the violation of the human rights of individuals by non-state
actors by organising state organs to apprehend such individuals and
ensure that they are brought to justice.173 
There was no doubt that because the non-state actors were involved
in the arrest and detention of individuals, the state prevented the victims
164 See Velasquez supra, para 172. 
165 S v Songezo Mini Unreported Case 141178 of 2015 (30 April 2015), paras
20, 21, 22. S v Zuko Unreported ECD Case CA & R159 of 2001. S v Hena
2006 2 SACR 33 (SE 40i-41b).
166 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, paras 3-4.
167 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 8.
168 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 142.
169 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, paras 139-141.
170 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, paras 139-141.
171 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 142.
172 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 143. Communication 272/
2003 Association of victims of Post Electoral Violence and Interights v
Cameroon para 89.
173 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 147. The Commission
referred to the ICCPR article 2(3)a, General Comment 20 of the HRC;
articles 2,3,8 and 14 of the European Convention. 
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of the crimes from obtaining relief from the domestic courts.174 The state
had an obligation to exercise due diligence and ensure that it did not
acquiesce to the use of evidence obtained through human rights
violations by non-state actors like vigilantes. Consequently, bringing such
individuals to justice for human rights violations, such as obtaining
evidence through torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
ought to have been alluded to by the African Commission under the
Principles. These Principles prohibit the collection of evidence through a
violation of a detained person’s rights175 and require that States Parties
put in place mechanisms for the receipt and investigation of
complaints.176 The African Commission did not address the issue of
evidence obtained through human rights violations. However, it pointed
to the need to uphold the rights of individuals who were affected by the
non-state actors. As such, laws like the Zimbabwe Decree 1 of 2000
which forecloses access to any remedy that may be available to victims
to vindicate their rights, had to be amended to ensure that Zimbabwe
does not renege on its commitment to the enjoyment of the right to a fair
trial by persons in its jurisdiction.177 
This complaint presented the Commission with a chance to rule on the
position of the vigilantes and the evidence they obtain. Its failure to offer
clarity on evidence obtained through human rights violations by
vigilantes presented a lacuna in its jurisprudence. It was expected that
the African Commission addressed the issue of vigilantes and how the
evidence they obtain is dealt with. This case offered the African
Commission a chance to use the development of domestic law to
improve the jurisprudence on evidence obtained by vigilantes.178 
4 4 Dealing with evidence obtained through torture
Various international and regional instruments impose obligations on
States Parties about evidence obtained through torture. There are
protective measures to ensure the training of law enforcement officers
on what constitutes torture or ill-treatment.179 The States Parties are
supposed to ensure that any statement made because of torture is not
used in evidence in any proceedings, except against the perpetrators as
evidence that the statement was made.180 
174 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, para 211.
175 The Principles, principle M(7)(d) - (f).
176 The Principles, principle M(7)(h).
177 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum supra, paras 214, ACHPR, arts 1 and 7.
178 Municipal law has been used before, to develop law at the regional level.
Compare the judgment of Sachs J in S v M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) and the
General Comment 1 of 2014 on children and caregivers (2015-11-30),
https://bit.ly/3110vke (last accessed 2020-08-17).
179 Declaration on the Protection against Torture (DPT) adopted by the UNGA
res 3452 (XXX) 1975-12-9, art 5. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) A/RES/70/175
para 54. 
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The States Parties are required to ensure that there are established
competent authorities to promptly and impartially investigate reasonable
grounds that there has been the commission of torture.181 It is expected
that there is subsequent prosecution of the perpetrators once it is
established that an act of torture has been committed.182 The States
Parties are required to streamline their legislation and bring it into
conformity with the Convention against Torture (CAT).183 The CAT
requires that the prosecution of perpetrators of torture should not be
subjected to discretion.184 This principle forms the core of the content in
the Robben Island Guidelines. However, this is limited to evidence
obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
In Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt, the
African Commission addressed the issue of evidence obtained through
torture.185 According to the complainants, agents of the State Security
Intelligence (the SSI) subjected the victims to various forms of torture and
ill-treatment during their detention to “confess” before the State Security
Prosecutor for their involvement in the Taba bombings.186 The victims
were held incommunicado for a long period without access to a lawyer.187
Subsequently, these confessions were used to convict the complainants
in the domestic court and sentenced to death.188 The main issue before
the African Commission was whether the complainants’ right to a fair
trial was violated. 
The African Commission relied on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to
state:
“Where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control
of the police, any such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the
person was subjected to ill-treatment. It is incumbent on the State to provide
a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, failing which a clear
issue arises under art 3 of the Convention.”189 
The African Commission held that since the respondent did not attempt
to give a satisfactory explanation, it was presumed that it was
180 CAT General Comment No. 2 Implementation of article 2 by States parties,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4 (2007), para 4(3). CCPR General
Comment No 13 Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and
Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law Doc HRI/GEN/
1/Rev.1 (1984) para 16 indicates that evidence obtained by way of
compulsion of any form is inadmissible.
181 UNCAT, art 12. General Comment 20, para 1. 
182 UNCAT, art 7. 
183 UN Doc CAT/C/7/Add.1 (23 November 1995) paras 10, 30. See also
Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Australia of 2008,
UN Doc CAT/C/AUS/CO/1 (15 May 2008) para 30.
184 UN Doc CAT/C/AUS/CO/1 (6 May 1998) para 11.
185 Egyptian Initiative supra, para 7.
186 Egyptian Initiative supra, para 7.
187 Egyptian Initiative supra, para 7.
188 Egyptian Initiative supra, para 8.
189 Colibaba v Moldova European Court of Human Rights Application 29089/
2006 para. 43
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responsible for the injuries. In addition, a confession obtained through
torture should not have been admitted in evidence.190 While this
decision marked the dawn of developing specific jurisprudence on
evidence obtained through human rights violations, the African
Commission did not question the State Prosecutor’s reluctance to
disallow the admission of the confession that was obtained through
human rights violations. This would have established a new line of
jurisprudence that required that both the law enforcement officers and
the prosecutors play an active role in ensuring that the rights of an
individual are upheld in pre-trial detention. This decision resonated with
the Principles in ensuring that evidence is not obtained through human
rights violations. The decision, however, did not expound on the role of
the prosecutor. This role is central to ensuring that in instances of human
rights abuses in pre-trial detention, the prosecutor evaluates which
evidence should be admitted. 
The African Commission referred to a wide range of international
jurisprudence from the HRC, the ECtHR, the Robin Island Guidelines and
The Principles.191 It adequately dealt with evidence obtained through
human rights violations as long as it amounted to torture, cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. The decision did not, however, recognise that
there are instances that may potentially lead to evidence obtained
through human rights violations other than torture. The Commission’s
engagement with the Robben Island Guidelines affected the quality of the
decision as far as the violation of the right against torture formed the
violation of the right to a fair trial. This decision presents a limitation in
the development of the jurisprudence as far as the African Commission
has not adequately dealt with other instances of evidence obtained
through human rights violations other than torture.
5 Conclusion
The definition of “jurisprudence” by Salmond, engages the basis,
development and the implementation of a law. This enables one to
approach the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies from a
normative and implementation perspective, based on the principles that
they present. Therefore, the limits in the jurisprudence of human rights
body are qualified by its ability to offer detailed and well reason
judgments other than a high number of decisions. It follows that the
quality of the decisions supersedes the sources of jurisprudence that a
human rights body uses in its decision. 
On this basis, the emerging jurisprudence of the African Commission
shows a limited development on evidence obtained through human
rights violations. First, the normative developments were not specifically
tailored to adequately deal with evidence obtained through human rights
190 Egyptian Initiative paras 191, 218. The Principles, principle N(6)(d)(1).
191 ACHPR, art 60.
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violations. This position changed with the adoption of the Robben
Guidelines and the Principles. Second, the development of the
jurisprudence has been generally targeted at enhancing the right to a fair
trial rather than specifically dealing with evidence obtained through
human rights violations. 
The African Commission has not adequately utilised its normative
principles to develop its jurisprudence concerning bringing the law into
conformity with the foregoing principles. It should make a deliberate
effort that engages evidence obtained through human rights violations.
This would be a departure from the general development of the right to
a fair trial that does not question the admission of evidence obtained
through human rights violations. Subject to further research rules on
admissibility should be revisited to ensure that the African Commission
deals with the merits of a communication with due regard to the
procedural technicalities involved. This is due to the existence of
procedural processes in various domestic jurisdictions on evidence
obtained through human rights violations. This failure stems from the
various levels of national developments on evidence obtained through
human rights violations. 
Where the African Commission requires that a State Party bring its law
into conformity with the African Charter, it should specify the impugned
parts of the law. Although the States Parties may choose to implement
the decisions of the Commission, it is instructive that the decisions
handed down due to evidence obtained through human rights violations
have specific requirements.192 This will aid the development of the
jurisprudence through its normative principles. Its reference to the Dakar
Declaration was hinged generally on the right to a fair trial and not on
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The decisions did
not offer guidance to issues of evidence obtained through human rights
violations because the norms did not do so. Some facts pointed to
obtaining evidence through human rights violations. The Commission’s
failure to engage the norms with these facts affected the quality of the
decision. This became a limitation in the development of its
jurisprudence as far as the Commission did not deal with issues of
evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
The recommendations of the African Commission in its Concluding
Observations on State Party Reports play a vital role in ensuring the non-
admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations. It
should use the same tools to advise States Parties on how to deal with this
kind of evidence. The admissibility of communications forms an integral
part of the complaint’s mechanism. The requirement to subject all
communications to the admissibility test of exhaustion of local remedies
is well-intentioned. The merits of each communication may have to be
known so that a value decision on admissibility is made. This addresses
the inequality because of domestic procedural requirements. 
192 Communication 368/2009 Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi v Republic of Sudan, para 93.
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